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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
RUSSELL lvi. MILLER COMPANY, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
B. T. GIVAN, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case 
No. 8773 
Brief of Plaintiff and Appellant 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the 29th day of May, 1957, judgment was made and 
entered in the District Court of Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, in favor of Russell Nl. Miller Company and against 
B. T. Givan, for the sum of $4,327.82. 
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On the 22nd day of July, 1957, garnishment was issued 
and served on the First Security Bank of Utah, Eighth South 
Branch, and the answer of the garnishee showed that the 
defendant and respondent, B. T. Givan, had on deposit in a 
checking account the sum of $865.41. 
On the 5th day of August, 1957, garnishee judgment was 
made and entered and garnishee execution issued thereon, and 
pursuant to said execution, the sheriff collected from the gar-
nishee the said sum of $865.41. 
Thereafter, to wit, on the 7th day of August, 1957, the 
defendant and respondent, B. T. Givan, filed an affidavit of 
exemption, claiming that $432.70 of said sum was exempt 
from execution under the law. On the 9th day of August, 
1957, the plaintiff and appellant filed a counter-affidavit 
alleging that the defendant was not entitled to any exemption 
under the Utah law. 
Hearing was had on the 20th day of September, 1957, 
and evidence and testimony were introduced by the respective 
parties. Thereafter, to-wit, on the 8th day of November, 1957, 
the District Court rendered its decision, holding that the de-
fendant and respondent, B. T. Givan, was entitled to a statutory 
exemption of one-half of his earnings for the 30 day period 
prior to levy, or $432.70 of the amount levied upon. 
Subsequently, the plaintiff and appellant filed its notice 
of appeal and posted a cost and supersedeas bond and desig-
nated the entire record on appeal. 
The defendant is a self employed buyer of used cars. He 
travels around the western states and purchases used auto-
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mobiles, and either drives them personally or hires persons 
to drive them to Salt Lake City, where all the cars are sold at 
the Salt Lake Auto Auction, South Salt Lake, Utah. The 
defendant purchases the cars on drafts drawn on the Salt Lake 
Auto Auction, which extends credit to him until such time as 
the automobiles are sold at the auction. Defendant's income 
is derived from the difference in what he purchases the cars 
for and what they bring over the auction less any amount paid 
out for expenses of transportation, repairs and incidentals. 
STATEMENT OF POINT 
Where one claims an exemption of one-half of his earn-
ings under the Utah exemption statutes, said earnings, to be 
exempt, must have been derived from services personally ren-
dered by the judgment debtor. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 
WHERE ONE CLAIMS AN EXEMPTION OF ONE-
HALF OF HIS EARNINGS UNDER THE UTAH EXEMP-
TION STATUTES, SAID EARNINGS, TO BE EXEMPT, 
MUST HAVE BEEN DERIVED FROM SERVICES PER-
SONALLY RENDERED BY THE JUDGMENT DEBTOR. 
"The word 'earnings' embraces a larger class of 
credits than the term 'wages'. It covers all compensa-
tion for services and may even include expenditures, 
as well as labor ... " 
Burns v. Maurer 
131 N.Y.S. 344 
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The word "earnings" as used in the exemption statute 
of Utah covers not only wages, but salaries and other sums 
derived from labor or services. However, earnings do not 
encompass gains created by the use of capital or credit. 
"Earnings are the gains of the person derived from 
his services or labor without the aid of capital." 
United Benefit Life Ins. of Omaha 
v. Zwan, 143 S.W. 2d 977,980 
"An exemption of earnings covers the gains of the 
debtor derived from his services or labor without the 
aid of capital." 
22 Am. Jur. 57 
Exemptions, Sec. 65 
The Utah statute provides an exemption for: 
"One-half of the earnings of the judgment debtor 
for his personal services rendered at any time within 
thirty days next preceding the levy of execution or 
attachment or otherwise . . . " 
78-23-1 (7), Utah Code Anno. 1953 
The Utah Legislature, by the use of the words, "personal 
services,'' has limited a debtor's exemption to services actually 
performed by him without the use of capital or credit. 
"While 'wages' and 'salary' exemptions are based on 
an employer and employee relation, 'earnings' and 'per-
sonal earnings' include earnings from a private and 
independent business, where the services of the debtor 
are the chief factor in it." 
35 C.J.S. 85 
Exemptions, Sec. 4 7 
ln the usc nO\\' before the court. Givan buys and sells 
automobiles, that is to say, Givan locates automobiles, draws 
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en the credit of the Salt Lake Auto Auction to purchase the 
autor:1obiles, and either drives them to Salt Lake City or hires 
others to drive them to Salt Lake City, and then turns them 
over to an auctioneer who sells the automobiles. 
Givan testified: 
"Well, I, I, am the buyer, then, in the true sense of 
the word. I contact the dealer personally and purchase 
the cars, and pay them by a draft drawn on the Salt 
Lake Auction and they honor the draft. And they fur-
nish the money to buy the cars, because I just haven't 
got the money to buy them." 
R. 6, 7. 
The necessity of capital or credit to carry on the business 
of Givan is admitted by him, and without this capital or credit 
there could be no business, and so the chief factor in the income 
of Givan is not personal services but capital. 
The case of Stranger vs. Harris, 77 Colo. 340, 236 P. 1001, 
involved the garnishment of the earnings of a defendant who 
was employed by contract to repair a road and who employed 
up to twenty men and up to twenty teams. It was held by the 
Supreme Court of the State of Colorado that his earnings were 
under the statute and the exemption applied. The case was 
decided on the theory that the services of the debtor defendant 
were the chief factor in the earnings derived from the contract. 
The Colorado statute provided: 
"There shall be exempt from levy under execution 
or attachment or garnishment sixty per cent of the 
amount due for wages or earnings of any debtor. " 
The Supreme Court held in its decision: 
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" 'Earnings' is a broader term than 'wages'. And it 
is a broader term than the term or expression 'personal 
earnings' or the expression 'earnings for personal serv-
ices'. 2) C. J. 68. Services of the debtor must, however, 
be the chief factor. 
"In the instant case, services of the debtor and his 
assistants were the chief factor. Capital was not." 
(Emphasis ours.) 
Stranger v. Harris 
77 Colo. 340, 236 P. 1001 
The California Court has held: 
''The weight of authority in other states appears to 
be that the terms 'personal earnings' and 'earnings for 
personal services' which are treated in many authori-
ties as synonymous, do not include a debtor's income 
arising from a business involving other elements of 
gain than his personal services such as the employ-
ment of capital or assets." 
Fay Securities Co. v. Bowering 
106 Cal A 771, 288 P. 41, 
Citing 25 C. J. 68 
This case exammes many jurisdictions and upholds the 
Corpus Juris rule (25 C. J. 69). In holding that the debtor 
was not entitled to an exemption, the court points out the 
fallacy of the Oklahoma case of \X'ineblood v. Payne, 129 
Okla. 103, 263 P. 669, in allowing any amount at all to be 
set up as wages exempt from execution. 
In this latter case, the debtor, the owner of a truck, was 
allowed an exemption under the Oklahoma exemption statute 
iur the value of the services rendered by his driver-operator 
of the truck, because of the nature of the personal services 
rendered by the driver. 
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"Where a debtor's income is derived from a business 
involving other elements of gain than his personal 
services, he is entitled to an exemption inasmuch 
thereof as is necessary to compensate him for his per-
sonal labor, provided it can be ascertained. But if the 
amount due the debtor on account of personal labor 
cannot be distinguished from the rest, no part of such 
income will be exempt as 'personal earnings' under 
the Statutes." 
25 C. J. 69, Cited in Wineblood 
v. Payne, 129 Okla 103, 263 P. 669 
In the case now before the Court, the defendant, Givan, 
cannot distinguish between what is earned by personal labor 
and what is gained by the use of capital and credit, and so 
the rule as set forth in 25 C. J. 69 is applicable and no amount 
of the income of the debtor is exempt under the statute. 
The cases have gone further in holding that there is a 
distinction between services and personal services. In the case 
of Levitt v. Faber, 20 Cal. A2d 758, 64 P.2d 498, the Cali-
fornia Court said: 
" 'Services' and 'personal services' are not definitely 
coextensive. Within the meaning of statutes such as 
that now under consideration and of exemption statutes, 
'services' may be rendered though the actual labor be 
performed by one's employees and by means of his 
machinery or other equipment, but 'personal services' 
are those performed by the individual himself." Citing 
cases. 
The Utah Supreme Court, in the case of Creameries of 
America v. Industrial Commission, 98 U. 571, 102 P.2d 300, 
in discussing the definition of the words, "personal service," 
said: 
9 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
''The general definition . . . as given in Webster's 
New International Dictionary ... The term 'personal 
service' indicates that the ·act' done for the benefit of 
another is done personally by a particular individual." 
The statute must be read with regard for the words used 
by the legislature when the law was enacted. 
"Courts should be slow to impart any other than 
their commonly understood meaning to terms em-
ployed in the enactment of a statute, and it is the 
policy of the courts to avoid giving statutory phrase-
ology a new, ... strained or forced .... or subtle 
meaning.'' 50 Am Jur 227, Statutes, Sec 238 
"Unless the contrary appears, the terms of legisla-
tive enactments must be taken in their ordinary and 
usual significance as they are generally understood 
among mankind." 
Emmertson v. State Tax Commission 
93 U. 219, 72 P2d 467 
In the majority of jurisdictions the rulings have been for 
a liberal construction of the exemption laws. However, in the 
case of Dayton v. Ewart, 28 Mont. 153, 72 P. 420, the Montana 
Supreme Court held in a case involving the garnishment of 
a miner's gold dust under a statute very similar to the Utah 
statute that: 
"But, while a liberal construction of the exemption 
la\\ s should always be encouraged, it will be readily 
perceived that too liberal construction thereof might 
lead to many abuses not contemplated by the lawmaking 
power, and we deem it proper to say that this case is 
determined and decided with reference to the facts pre-
sented only. 'Each case of this character must rest upon 
its own facts existing at the time in question.' Cushing 
v. Quigley, 11 .Niont 577, 29 P. 377." 
10 
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The Supreme Court in this case held that the miner's gold 
dust was under the exemption statute, justifying its decision 
on the theory that because a miner's tools are exempt, so should 
the fruit of his labor be exempt. 
However, in the dissenting opinion, written by Justice 
Muilburn, he said: 
"I cannot understand that this section expresses or 
implies an intention on the part of the legislature to 
protect income from a private and independent busi-
ness from levy, if such income be not for services ren-
dered others." 
In the instant case, Givan testified that his gross for the 
period of thirty days prior to the garnishment was between 
$4,700.00 and $5,000.00. 
"Well, my, I just estimated one statement, because 
I couldn't find it and I didn't have time to go to the 
auction and get it, but I'd say between forty-seven hun-
dred and $5,000 were my gross earnings in that period." 
R. 4 
In this case, if a liberal interpretation is adopted by the court 
in holding that the gains of this independent contractor whose 
income is derived primarily from the use of capital and credit 
and not from services personally rendered, and whose gross in-
come for a thirty day period exceeded $4700, is exempt, then 
such an interpretation of the statute is not what was contemplat-
ed by the legislature when this statute was enacted. The statue 
is primarily designed to protect the wage earner and his family 
from being placed in a destitute status by the possibility of 
having all of the earnings of the head of the household subject 
to attachment or garnishment. 
11 
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"The purpose of exemption laws generally is to 
protect an unfortunate debtor and save to him the 
means of supporting his family." 
Michenheim v. Cathcart 
54 ALR 2d 1418, 288 La 890, 
84 So2d 449 
"Exemption laws ... are designed to give assurance 
that the wage earner shall always have enough, beyond 
the reach of attaching creditors, to support his family 
and prevent them from becoming public charges." 
Hollywood Credit Clothing Co. 
v. Jones, 51 ALR 2d 944, 
Mun Ct App Dist Col, 
117 A2d 226. 
CONCLUSION 
The plaintiff-appellant contends that the exemption statute 
of the State of Utah should be properly interpreted in the light 
of the cases discussed heretofore. The cases and authorities 
have pointed out that an exemption of earnings covers the 
gains of the debtor derived from his services or labor without 
the aid of capital, and, further, that "personal services" means 
that the individual must have personally rendered the service 
in connection with the earning of the money claimed exempt. 
Respectfully submitted, 
COTRO-l\1ANES & COTRO-MANES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant 
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